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1. Introduction
The growing internationalization of the securities markets is a well-documented
trend 1 which is likely to continue. Although some in the United States have
expressed concern over the possibility of non-U.S. control of domestic businesses
and industries, the basic policy of the U.S. remains one of encouraging the free flow
of capital. These transnational transactions are viewed as being beneficial to the
capital markets and the U.S. balance of trade. Nevertheless, they present the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") with significant
enforcement and regulatory problems.
Transnational dealings are of legitimate concern to the Commission if they
involve securities of U.S. corporations or U.S. citizens, or if they have an impact on
U.S. securities markets. The Commission's role is to protect investors (principally,
but not exclusively, U.S. investors) and the U.S. securities markets, and in the performance of that role the Commission seeks to protect U.S. residents from fraud
and also to prevent fraudulent activities from occurring in the U.S. The Commission
also has a legitimate concern, in this time of rapid and sophisticated international
communications, to prevent any one from using foreign instrumentalities to evade
the U.S. securities laws.
Increasingly, in attempting to enforce the U.S. securities laws in cases having
international aspects, the Commission has found it necessary to proceed against
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foreign financial institutions which were directly involved in violative conduct or
which were being used, unwittingly, by others to evade the U.S. securities laws.
Such cases involve difficult questions of the proper jurisdictional reach of U.S. law
and present delicate problems of diplomacy. Nevertheless, when the Commission
has believed it necessary for the protection of investors and the securities markets
and for fulfillment of the purposes of the U.S. securities laws, it has not hesitated,
either in actions initiated by it or in private actions, to urge U.S. courts to assert
broad bases of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Commission has had
substantial success in conducting investigations and in obtaining appropriate relief
in U.S. courts, frequently with the assistance of foreign regulatory bodies, but a
number of cases have raised questions concerning the Commission's ability to obtain relief against and information from foreign institutions. From another point of
view, these latter cases also raise questions as to the impact an aggressive assertion
of jurisdiction in this area might, to the extent sustained by the courts, have on
international business and on international relations. This article will discuss some
of the different types of cases which have arisen 2 and will indicate the doctrinal
bases on which the Commission predicates jurisdiction in such cases.
The extent of extraterritorial 3 application of U.S. laws, and of U.S. securities
laws in particular, has been discussed many times, and this article will not attempt
an exhaustive treatment of that subject. Nevertheless, some analysis of the leading
cases will be necessary as background and to set forth general guiding priciples,
particularly because three recent cases, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., 4 IIT V.
Vencap, Ltd., 5 and S.E.C. v. Kasser, 6 have not yet received extensive analysis or
interpretation. Consequently, the first part of this article will treat some of the
major principles concerning the application of U.S. securities laws to transactions
having international aspects and will summarize the statutory bases for Commission
jurisdiction. The second part of the article will look at the types of cases in which
the Commission has asserted jurisdiction to proceed against non-U.S. financial
institutions and will attempt to formulate some conclusions as to the proper role of
the Commission in those cases.

2. Pertinent provisions of the securities laws
Before getting into the substance of the discussion, it seems appropriate to summarize those provisions of the U.S. securities laws which prescribe the Commission's authority to bring suit and which define the jurisdictional elements of a violation. 7 Unfortunately, the U.S. securities laws are not explicit about whether and to
what extent they are to be applied extraterritorially. 8 Nevertheless, the concern of
Congress with the problem of transnational securities dealings is expressed in the
very title of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"):
An act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
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operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes. 9

In addition, Section 2 of the Exchange Act, 10 which sets forth the necessity for
regulation, refers several times to the need for protecting "interstate commerce",
which, in turn, is defined by Section 3(a) (17) 1 to include "trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication ... between any foreign country and any state,
or between any state and any place or ship outside thereof".
The definition of interstate commerce is important because many operative provisions of the Exchange Act, including Section 10(b) (the basic antifraud provision
of the Act), make the use of "any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" a jurisdictional predicate for their application. 12 These operational provisions are also invoked, generally speaking, by the use of the mails or the facilities of
a national securities exchange. Other provisions apply in case of the involvement of
a registered security or apply to persons in the securities business. 13
Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act 14 authorizes the Commission to file an
injunctive action in the proper United States district court whenever "it shall
appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to engage in any
acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this title, [or] the rules
or regulations thereunder.. .". Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides the United
States district courts with exclusive jurisdiction of suits involving violations of the
Act and the rules and regulations thereunder. Section 27 also provides for service of
process "in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found". 15
The Commission is also authorized to bring administrative proceedings against
broker-dealers or persons associated with them (Sections 15(b) (4) and (6) of the
Exchange Act). 16 Since non-U.S. banks or other financial institutions might come
within the definition of a broker or dealer, 17 it is possible for such entities to be
the subjects of Commission administrative proceedings in appropriate cases. See, for
example, the discussion of In the Matter of Stephen Smith in the text accompanying footnote 146, infra. The Commission also has broad investigatory powers under
Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act. 18
A final jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act which has been involved in
some of the cases involving extraterritorial application is Section 30(b), 19 which
provides:
The provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person
insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States,
unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.

The Commission has adopted no rules under this Section. The scope of this exemption is discussed later in the article.
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The substantive provisions of the securities laws are many and complex; however, the preponderance of extraterritoriality cases have involved a relatively small
number of key sections. A substantial majority of the cases have involved Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act 20 and Rule 1Ob-5 21 thereunder. As indicated earlier,
Section 10(b) is the basic antifraud provision of the Exchange Act. It proscribes the
use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security by use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national securities
exchange. It is a very broadly worded section, and, as wvill be seen, the Commission
has consistently argued that it should be applied broadly in cases of international
fraud.
Another fundmental provision of the U.S. securities laws which has been
involved in some of these cases is Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. 22 Section 5 is the heart of the Securities Act and requires public offerings of securities to
be registered with the Commission and sold pursuant to a prospectus containing
proper disclosure. Like Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Section 5 makes it unlawful for any person to use the mails or any means of interstate commerce to
accomplish various aspects of the offer and sale of securities without complying
with the substantive provisions of the Section.
Two other provisions which have frequently been involved in international cases
are Sections 13(d) 23 and 16 24 of the Exchange Act. These provisions are of the
type alluded to earlier which apply when a registered security is involved. 25 Section 13(d) imposes reporting requirements on certain beneficial owners of more
than five percent of a class of stock that is registered under Section 12. Section 16
imposes reporting requirements and trading restrictions on certain 10 percent beneficial owners, officers, and directors. These sections apply to "any person" or
"every person" in the designated class, and Section 13(d) defines "person" to
include a group of persons acting together. These provisions have frequently come
into play in international cases because persons seeking to evade the law have
attempted to use non-U.S. financial institutions as a shield. The Commission has
aggressively sought to prevent such evasion.

3. Summary of extraterritorial application of the securities laws in decided cases
Since the U.S. securities laws, like most U.S. statutes, are not explicit about
extraterritoriality, 26 the U.S. courts have sought to ascertain Congressional intent,
recognizing that the only limitation on the exercise of Congressional power is the
U.S. Constitution. As the court said in Leasco DataProcessingEquipment Cowp. v.
Maxwell ("Leasco"):
(I]f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United States,
even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations laws, a United States court
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would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would-violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment 27

However, since the legislative history behind the securities laws does not provide
any significant guidance as to extraterritoriality, 28 the courts have been unwilling
to "... assume that the legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted". 29 In attempting to define appropriate limitations on the extraterritorial
application of the securities laws, the courts have referred extensively to principles
of international law. 3o Moreover, the courts seem uniformly to have considered the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) (hereinafter referred to as the Restatement) to be an authoritative statement of international law. 31
However, the cases have not simply adopted the Restatement principles as
rigorous guides to the extraterritorial application of the securities laws. 32 Indeed,
the courts have engaged in extensive speculation as to the intent of Congress of the
"what would Congress have wanted, if it had ever thought of this problem"
type. 33
Nonetheless, the courts (as well as academic commentators) have frequently
used the Restatement principles as a framework for the analysis of the issue,
making it convenient to do so for the purposes of this discussion as well. 34 In particular, the discussion of extraterritoriality has turned on two provisions of the
Restatement: Section 17 3' and Section 18.36 Section 17 describes what is generally
referred to as the "subjective territorial principle", which is, in substance, that a
state has jurisdiction 'over acts which occur within its territory even when the
effects of such acts are felt only outside the state's territory. Jurisdiction based on
this principle is also described as conduct-based jurisdiction. Section 18 describes
the so-called "objective territorial principle", which provides that a nation may
regulate conduct which occurs outside its territory and produces an effect within
its territory. Jurisdiction based on this principle is sometimes called effects-based or
impact-based jurisdiction. Accordingly, determinations as to whether jurisdiction
should lie in particular cases have tended to be based on an analysis of whether
there was sufficient conduct in the United States and/or whether transactions performed entirely outside the United States nevertheless had a direct, foreseeable, and
substantial impact on U.S. investors or securities markets. 37

4. Subjective territorial principle
The Restatement permits a broad assertion of jurisdiction by a state over conduct within its territory, even when the consequences of such conduct are felt outside the territory. 38 Since many substantive provisions of the Exchange Act, such
as Section 10(b), proscribe use of the means of interstate commerce in connection
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with any violative conduct, the Commission has argued strenuously that any use of
the jurisdictional means in connection with violative conduct is sufficient to trigger
jurisdiction even if the transaction is primarily a foreign one. 39 The Commission
has stressed that it is well established, at least in purely domestic U.S. cases, that a
mere preparatory or tangential use of the jurisdictional means is sufficient. 40 The
policy behind this position is discussed infra in the section on "The Commission
Position".
Nevertheless, the courts have not been willing to go to the limits permitted by
international law in sustaining conduct-based jurisdiction, at least in private suits.
The earlier cases, primarily involving U.S. private plaintiffs, required that there be
"significant conduct" 41 or conduct constituting an "essential link" 42 in the transaction in the U.S. More recently, major decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc. 43 and
IT v. Vencap, Ltd. 44 have distinguished between preparatory acts and acts constituting perpetration of a fraud, but have also framed different standards depending on the residence and nationality of the plaintiffs and on whether or not the suit
was a class action on behalf of foreigners. Both because of what the Second Circuit
has said and because of what it has not said about Commission enforcement actions,
the level of conduct necessary to support jurisdiction in a Commission suit is not
entirely clear. No court has directly considered this question, 45 although the recent
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ("Third Circuit") in
S.E.C.v. Kasser 4 6 may provide significant guidance. Below is a brief summary of
these three recent cases followed by an attempt to analyze their impact on Commission actions.
IT v. Vencap, like many of the recent extraterritoriality cases, resulted from
the well-publicized IOS collapse. 47 The court found that jurisdiction could exists if
the facts disclosed that the U.S. had been used for the perpetration of fraudulent
acts themselves, as opposed to mere preparatory activities or a failure to prevent
fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries. 48 The court referred the matter back to the district court for further findings. 49
In arriving at its conclusion, the Second Circuit court utilized the following
reasoning:
We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners. This country would surely look askance if one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into the United States. By the same token it is
hard to believe Congress meant to prohibit the SEC from policing similar activities within this
country; we doubt that the result in S.E.C. v. UnitedFinancialGroup, Inc., 474 F. 2d 354, 357

(9 Cir. 1973), would have differed if the court had not been able to find that the issuer was an
American corporation and that three American investors held $10,000 of its probably worth-

less stock. If there would be subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by the SEC to prevent the
concoction of securities frauds in the United States for export, there would also seem to be
jurisdiction over a suit for damages or rescission by a defrauded foreign individual.
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The holding In 11T applies directly to suits by named foreign plaintiffs only, but
the reference to SEC enforcement actions appears to imply that the right of foreign
plaintiffs to sue is coextensive with the right of the SEC to "prevent the concoction
of securities frauds in the United States for export". Consequently, the distinction
between perpetration of fraud and mere preparatory acts may be read as limiting
the SEC's power to sue. s The Second Circuit court used similar language in Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., 52 which also resulted from the IOS disaster, and which
was decided the same day as 1IT. Such a conclusion would substantially inhibit the
Commission's power to prevent U.S. facilities from being abused in connection with
international fraudulent dealings. However, as will be seen, part of the Bersch holding appears to contradict the implication the language cited above has for SEC
actions.
In Bersch, the court made sharp distinctions among U.S. residents, U.S. citizens
residing abroad, and foreigners, i.e., persons who were neither U.S. citizens nor U.S.
residents. The court observed that, had the case involved a suit by foreign plaintiffs
against a foreign company identified with a foreign country, the activities in the
U.S. would not have justified jurisdiction. The court cited its holding in lIT v.
Vencap quoted above and noted that that holding went farther than any other case in
authorizing jurisdiction in U.S. courts over suits by foreign plaintiffs. S3 The court
stated that there could not be jurisdiction for foreign plaintiffs in cases "where the
United States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable
nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad". 54 The court's
formal holding was that the securities laws:.
[dio not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States
unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused such losses. 55

Next, the court discussed the question of U.S. investors, distinguishing between
residents and nonresidents. The court viewed the case with respect to U.S. residents
as involving application of the objective territorial principle, so that aspect of the
case will be discussed later under the appropriate heading.
With respect to the question of liability for sales to U.S. citizens resident abroad,
the court concluded that there would not be jurisdiction in the absence of significant activities within the U.S. The court stated:
Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to protect the many thousands of Americans
residing in foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners acting there, and we see no

sufficient reason to believe it would have intended otherwise simply because an American
participated so long as he had done nothing in the United States. 56

Nevertheless, the court stated:
While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger application of
the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is
to Americans so resident. 57
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The formal holding of the court was that the securities laws:
[a]pply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but only if, acts

(or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United States have significantly contributed thereto. 58
This holding, to the extent it suggests anything about the jurisdictional standards
to be applied in cases brought by the Commission, appears to contradict the implication contained in the court's explicit reference to the SEC in its discussion of
jurisdiction over suits by foreign plaintiffs in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., and in Bersch
itself. 59 In those discussions, the court indicated that foreigners had the same right
to sue as the SEC, thereby implying that the SEC, like foreigners, can sue only if
acts in the U.S. constitute the perpetration of the fraud and are not merely preparatory to it. The Bersch discussion of American nonresidents, however, permits suits
by such persons even when the conduct in the U.S. was "merely preparatory" so
long as the conduct was "of material importance".
A result which would permit nonresident Americans to maintain suit in U.S.
federal courts for violation of the securities laws but not let the SEC sue on the
same facts would be anomalous. Consequently, it appears unlikely that the court
would actually require more actionable conduct to satisfy jurisdiction requirements
in an injunctive action brought by the SEC, the agency charged with protecting all
investors, as well as the domestic securities markets and the public interest in
general, than in an action brought by a private party. This conclusion is bolstered
by the court's observation that the Bersch case raised problems regarding the
dubious binding effect of a judgment for defendant on absent foreign plaintiffs in a
class action that are not present when the SEC seeks to enjoin the activity or when
an action is brought by named plaintiffs.
The Third Circuit recently gave further definition to the Commission's authority
to sue in S.E.C. v. Kasser, 60 which involved an appeal by the Commission from an
adverse district court finding on jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed and
remanded, relying heavily on 11T v. Vencap. The court noted that, although it was
questionable whether the alleged fraudulent activities of the defendants had any
effects in the U.S., there was "significant conduct which formed part of the
defendants' scheme that did occur within this country" 61 _ conduct which "was
essential to the plan to defraud" 62 and which went beyond activities of a preparatory nature. Referring to the opinion in IT, the court stated: "I he conduct of
the defendants here cannot be deemed to be 'merefly] preparatory' to fraudulent
acts committed outside this country, for it was much more substantial than the
United States-based activities in IIT' 63
The court thus viewed the facts in Kasser as presenting a relatively strong case
for jurisdiction. Its language, however, indicated that jurisdiction would exist even
on a lesser showing. Relying on IT, as well as its own decision in Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 64 the court stated that "the Federal securities laws in our view do
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grant jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where at least some activity
designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country". 65 The court
found three sound policy rationales for its decision: (1) "to deny such jurisdiction may embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or
sellers to use the United States as a base of operations"; 66 (2) "a holding of no
jurisdiction might induce reciprocal responses on the part of other nations"; 67 and
(3) "reviving the complaint in this case ... will enhance the ability of the SEC to
police vigorously the conduct of securities dealings within the United States". 68
Despite the Third Circuit's heavy reliance on HT,the Kasser and Bersch opinions
suggest that the level of conduct which may be considered "significant" would be
fairly low in a Commission action. The Kasser opinion contains language which implicitly suggests that a finding that significant conduct occurred may be made as
long as there is "at *least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme".
Despite certain contradictory language, it is submitted that the Commission could
sue under the Bersch decision even if the only activities in the U.S. were preparatory. If so, it would appear that anyone involved in conduct constituting a violation
of the securities laws would be amenable to Commission suit if he engaged in activities connected with the violation in the U.S. which went beyond a minimal or
incidental level. Since the Commission has not abandoned its contention that any
such conduct would be sufficient, it would seem advisable for violators to stay
entirely away from this jurisdiction. Perhaps they will, but experience suggests that
this issue will continue to come before the courts. 69

5. Objective territorial principle
Generally speaking, it would be permissible under Restatement Section 18 to
assert jurisdiction with respect to foreign violative conduct having a substantial,
direct and foreseeable domestic effect. 70 There has been substantial controversy
and uncertainty as to whether the U.S. cases support assertion of jurisdiction to the
full extent permitted by international law. In particular, although the U.S. courts
have analyzed cases in terms of Restatement Section 18, there has been doubt as to
whether jurisdiction may be had on the basis of "effects" alone or whether there
must also be conduct in the U.S. 71 It now appears that jurisdiction may exist
under the decided cases on the basis of harmful effects alone.
As was the case with conduct-based jurisdiction, the Second Circuit has had the
most to say on this subject. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook72 was the first case to
apply the objective territorial principle. 73 The court held:
WVe believe that Congress intended -the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in

order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign
transactions in American securities. In our view, neither the usual presumption against extraterri-
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torial application of legislation nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show Congressional
intent to preclude application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in
the United States which are effected outside the United States, when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors. 74

There remained doubt as to whether jurisdiction could attach in the absence of
any domestic conduct. 75 However, Bersch appears to have resolved the problem.
As indicated earlier, the Bersch court viewed its determination as to jurisdiction
with respect to U.S. resident members of the plaintiff class as involving an application of the objective territorial principle and permitted suit against two defendants
whom it found responsible for "dispatch[ing] from abroad misleading statements
to United States residents", 76 characterizing the case as being of the type contemplated by Restatement Section 18. The specific holding was:
...The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United States whether
or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country. 77

The court went on to uphold jurisdiction over an accountant for IOS which had
certified the financial statements used in the offering, stating that "... . action in the
United States is not necessary when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on a
direct effect here ...". 78 Accordingly, Bersch made it explicit that jurisdiction

may be based on adverse domestic effects alone.
Other U.S. Courts of Appeal appear to agree. In Travis v. Anthes, 79 the Eighth
Circuit court stated:
We are also persuaded that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are applicable to defendants' selfdealing, even if it is assumed that all such dealings took place in Canada. "It is settled law.....
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends ...".80

The Ninth Circuit said recently in Des Brisay v. The Goldfleld Corporation:81
...In short, in view of Congress's intention to protect the integrity of domestic securities
markets in a particular stock, the fact that an allegedly improper transaction occurred outside
the United States or involved parties other than United States citizens has been held not to
defeat subject matter jurisdiction where the securities involved in the transaction were registered and listed on a national exchange and the effect of the foreign transaction adversely
affected buyers, sellers and holders of those securities. 82
Of course, the Restatement requires that those effects be substantial, direct,

and foreseeable. The cases have not fully defined these concepts, but they do suggest some important characteristics. For one thing, it is not sufficient to allege that
foreign acts have had "an adverse effect on the American economy or American
investors generally". 83 Nor is a U.S. investor protected from a securities fraud com-
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mitted entirely abroad because the harm such an investor suffered abroad was felt
at home. 84 Moreover, it has been held that any impairment of the value of U.S.
investments must result from the securities fraud itself and not from subsequent unrelated transactions, 85 and that real estate investments in the U.S. by a foreign
issuer did not create the necessary impact. 86 In short, it appears clear that, in order
for there to be jurisdiction over foreign acts constituting a substantive violation of
the U.S. securities laws, those acts must in and of themselves result in substantial
damage to an interest protected by the U.S. securities laws. In a fraud case, that
would mean that the violations would have to affect investors "in whom the United
States has an interest", 87 presumably U.S. investors who were the victims of fraud
that had some U.S. nexus, 88 or that the fraud would have to have a direct effect on
the market for a domestically traded security (i.e., a foreign-based manipulation of
such a security 89). In the case of provisions like Section 13(d) and Section 16 of
the Exchange Act - which require disclosure of certain securities transactions by
large stockholders and corporate officers - the protected interest would be defined
by the Congressional purpose behind them. Accordingly, if Congress's intent that
certain beneficial ownership interests be disclosed, for example, is thwarted by acts
occurring abroad, it would appear that a sufficient impact would have occurred. 90
On the other hand, it does not appear to be necessary that the securities be
registered or exchange-listed (except in the case of provisions which only apply if
registered or listed securities are involved) or that the issuer of the securities be a
U.S. company. 91 Nor does the nationality of the defendant appear to be crucial. 92
Again, the salient factor appears to be impact on a U.S. interest which the courts
believe Congress meant to protect.

6. Personal jurisdiction
Most of the cases involving extraterritorial application of the securities laws have
-dealt with the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, as indicated earlier, Section 27 of the Exchange Act gives district courts jurisdiction over violations
of the Act and provides for service of process "wherever the defendant may be
found". Nevertheless, concepts of personal jurisdiction have been significant in a
number of cases.
It is a fundamental notion in the U.S. that a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be consistent with U.S. concepts of due process of
law. U.S. due process concepts as to jurisdiction over the person require not only
adequate notice and an opportunity for hearing but certain minimum contacts
with the jurisdiction "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' ". 93 The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that when a defendant is not personally present and there is no other demonstrable basis for jurisdiction, it is "essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
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ties within the foreign state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws. 94
The courts have held that Congress meant Section 27 to extend personal jurisdiction to the fullest reach permitted by the due process clause. 95 In Leasco, the
court said:
...use of the word "wherever", [in Section 27] rather than "where" or "in which", demonstrates an intention to authorize service on a defendant who can be "found" only in a foreign
country, and although tile
section does not deal specifically with in personanjurisdiction, it is
reasonable to infer that Congress meant to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners not
present in the United States to but, of course, not beyond the bounds permitted by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 96

The Second Circuit held in Leasco and reaffirmed in Bersch that the boundaries
of due process, in the case of a defendant not personally present at the time of
service, were set forth in Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, which the court said in large part merely amplified the central
idea contained in Hanson v. Dencka. 97 Section 35 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1969) confers jurisdiction over persons doing business in a state.
Section 36 confers jurisdiction over persons doing an act in a state. Section 37
applies to persons causing effects in a state by acts done elsewhere. These principles
also apply to corporations (Sections 47, 49, and SO).
As the Second Circuit stated in Leasco:
All this reflects the modern notions that where a defendant has acted within a state or sufficiently caused consequences there, he may fairly be subjected to its judicial jurisdiction even
though be cannot be served with process in the state, and that the principal function of service
of process is rather to give notice and opportunity to be heard, which can be done by appropriate methods of service outside the state. 98
The courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which
controlled a U.S. corporation 99 and a foreign corporation which did a substantial
amount of business in the U.S. 100 The Eighth Circuit held in Travis v. Anthes that:
[P] ersonal jurisdiction can be acquired over the defendants who have acted within the district
or sufficiently caused foreseeable consequences there, by service of process on them in
Canada. 101

On the other hand, in Leasco the court rejected the idea that an accountant
conducting an improper audit of a company in London "could be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in any country whose citizen had purchased stock of a company they had audited...". 102
In Bersch the court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the
Canadian broker-dealer which had managed the third IOS offering (one which was
not made in the U.S.). The court found that the broker-dealer was not doing
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business in the U.S. even though its business consisted of buying and selling
securities traded on Canadian markets for U.S. residents and arranging with U.S.
broker-dealers for its Canadian customers to buy and sell securities traded in U.S.
markets and even though representatives of the broker-dealer visited U.S. investment bankers and brokerage firms to solicit this type of business. The court held
that if that type of activity constituted doing business within the U.S.:
[Elvery securities dealer of any significant size anywhere in the world would be "doing business" here. 103
The court also refused to predicate jurisdiction on Section 37 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, concluding that there was nothing to show that the
broker-dealer had knowledge that some of the purchasers of the second IOS offering would be U.S. persons and that, accordingly, the "effects" of the brokerdealer's actions in the U.S. were not sufficiently direct and foreseeable. Not surprisingly, the court expressed doubt about subject matter jurisdiction but found it unnecessary to reach the question.
These decisions suggest that personal jurisdiction exists if subject matter jurisdiction exists on the basis of conduct or impact, provided that the defendant was
sufficiently involved in the disputed transaction so that his retention as a defendant
is not inconsistent with the fair play concept. 104 The Bersch decision, however,
indicates that the courts may have some difficulty delimiting the concept of doing
business in a "state" within the meaning of Section 35 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws. In view of the international scope of the securities business,
the court was clearly concerned about casting too wide a net. However, the court's
analysis of the doing business criteria appears strained. It is submitted that the
court could have paid less attention to the question of whether the broker-dealer
was doing business within the state and more attention to the proviso in Section 35
that jurisdiction only be exercised with respect to matters arising from business
done in the state. m0
7. The section 30(b) exemption
Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act provides an exemption from the Act for
persons engaging in the securities business 106 "'without the jurisdiction of the
United States", but gives the Commission rulemaking power to prevent such
persons from transacting their business in a way which evades the U.S. securities
laws. It is clear that a person otherwise entitled to rely on this exemption who
engages in transactions which come within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
U.S. loses the benefits of the exemption with respect to those transactions. 107 in
Schoenbaum, the court indicated that the purpose of the section was to relieve
foreign persons in the securities business from reporting and regulation under the
Exchange Act. 108
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The Commission has never adopted any rules under Section 30(b); nor has it ever
officially explained the absence of such rules. There are, however, a number of
probable explanations. In the first place, and most important, neither the Comimission nor the courts have given the Section 30(b) exemption broad application. As
stated in Schoenbaun, the exemption applies only to foreign brokers, dealers and
banks and its primary purpose appears to be to relieve foreign securities firms from
being subject to the whole panoply of broker-dealer registration and reporting
under the Exchange Act, simply because they might engage in some transactions
which could not be classified as "without the jurisdiction of the United States", for
purposes of Section 30(b). As indicated elsewhere in this article, transactions within
the jurisdiction of the U.S. are not limited to transactions within the territory of
the U.S., but may include, under some circumstances, transactions executed abroad
or sales of securities into the U.S. from abroad.
Given this relatively narrow scope of the exemption, the activities of foreign
securities firms, at least historically, have not presented a serious problem for the
Commission. In addition, while thought has been given from time to time to trying
to develop rules under Section 30(b), it has proved difficult to frame rules which
would not either tend, by implication or otherwise, to broaden the Section 30(b)
exemption or else to involve the Commission in a difficult task of attempting to
regulate broker-dealers or banks in foreign countries. 109 The exemption provided
by Section 30(b) has not heretofore impaired the ability of the Commission to
enforce the fraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws in international transactions
or its ability to require compliance with the registration requirements of the Securities Act where such compliance was needed for the protection of U.S. investors.
The increasing internationalization of the securities markets may in the future
require further attention to rules under Section 30(b), but this has not yet become
necessary.

8. U.S. requirements that may violate foreign law
At times, one party in a U.S. law suit seeks documents which the other party
claims may not lawfully be produced under applicable foreign law. The court in
such a case must decide whether or not to order production of the documents in
the face of the claim that to do so would violate foreign law and, if it orders their
production, what sanctions may be imposed for noncompliance with the order.
Recently, the Tenth Circuit had occasion to consider these problems in a case
under the U.S. securities laws: Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver. 110 In that
case, Arthur Andersen & Co. objected to the production of certain documents on
the ground that their production would violate the Swiss secrecy laws. The district
court had overruled the objections, which had led to appeals and a petition for a
writ of mandamus. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Socidte Internationale v. Rogers 111 and concluded that con-
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sideration of foreign law in a discovery context is required in dealing with sanctions
to be imposed for disobedience and not in deciding whether the discovery order
should issue. The court criticized certain Second Circuit cases which suggest that a
district court should not order production if the order would cause a party to
violate foreign law. According to the Tenth Circuit court, these decisions fail to
recognize the distinction between the power to compel discovery and the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with an order for production. 112
The Tenth Circuit court stated that the dilemma it confronted was that of
accommodation of the principles of the law of the forum with concepts of due process and international comity. The court stated that it was not impressed by Arthur
Andersen's contention that international comity prevents a U.S. court from ordering actions which violate foreign law. The court stated that foreign law may not
control local law. 113 The court then determined that the district court's discovery
order was not a final decision and was not appealable. Consequently, the appeals
were dismissed. The petition for mandamus was also denied.
These cases do not make it clear exactly what the consequences would be of the
failure of a defendant in a Commission enforcement action to produce documents
on the ground that to do so would violate foreign law. However, in S.E.C. v.
American Institute Counsellors, Inc., 114 the district court judge, at the Commission's request, ordered the transfer of certain assets held by Swiss Credit Bank from
Switzerland to the U.S., recognizing that such a transfer would violate Swiss law.
The judge declined to defer to Swiss banking law and customs because of Swiss
Credit Bank's participation in the alleged violations and because control of the
assets in question was necessary for the proper protection of investors. An agreement which satisfied the Commission was reached without appeal.
Clearly, there remain unresolved problems in this area, which could make it
difficult for the Commission to obtain relief in future cases. 1 Is

9. The commission position
In the foregoing discussion of the state of the law, much was said about the
expansive view of jurisdiction the Commission has urged on U.S. courts. It is appropriate now to say something about why the Commission has taken such an aggressive position, especially in view of the frequent criticisms of that position for failure
to give weight to such factors as sovereignty, international comity, and the welfare
of international business.
It is not enough to say that the Commission is only concerned with enforcing
the U.S. securities laws, although the Commission takes that responsibility very
seriously indeed and to that end has consistently advocated a broad assertion of
jurisdiction in cases involving international aspects as necessary to the achievement
of the essential goals of the U.S. securities laws of protection of investors and the
securities markets. It must also be said that the Commission has not been insensitive

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1978

18

P.A. Loomis, jr., R. W. Grant / Extraterritorialapplication of U.S. securities laws

to the broader considerations of international relations and business. A look at the
Commission's arguments in its briefs and at the way it has handled some of its cases
(many of which were not the subjects of judicial opinions) indicates that the Commission believes that vigorous enforcement of the U.S. securities laws can lead to
international cooperation and can help foster a climate of certainty, trust, and confidence for international business.
These cases show the ways in which international fraud artists and persons seeking to evade the regulatory and disclosure requirements of the U.S. securities laws
have sought "gaps in international regulation through which a modern-day pirate
may safely sail". 116 In particular, these cases show the ways in which foreign
financial institutions, particularly banks and offshore investment companies, have
been used, with varying degrees of awareness, to shield or facilitate such violations
and evasions.
10. Jurisdiction revisited
To reiterate a bit, the Commission has pointed out that the definition of interstate commerce in Section 3(a) (17) of the Exchange Act to include commerce
between any foreign country and any State is indicative of the concern of Congress
with transnational transactions. "I The Commission has consistently cited the
numerous cases holding that the U.S. securities acts, as remedial legislation, are to
be broadly construed, 118 and has argued that Congress intended all provisions of
the U.S. securities laws to be broadly construed, including those dealing with jurisdiction. 119
Accordingly, the Commission has argued strenuously for broad application of
the U.S. securities laws in cases in which the jurisdictional triggering element is present. In cases under Section 10(b), the Commission has pointed out that the jurisdictional requirements are met if the facilities of interstate commerce are used il
connection with a fraudulent scheme, even if such use is incidental of merely
preparatory. 120 The Commission has argued that such application would protect
investors and help foster an atmosphere beneficial to honest enterprise by preserving investor confidence in the securities markets. 121 Moreover, as the Commission said in its anicus curiae brief in the Schoenbaunz case:
This country has a direct and immediate interest in the regulation of the uses to which the

mails, means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and facilities of national securities
exchanges are put. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated, "Quite obviously
the broad purpose of this legislation was to keep the channels of interstate commerce, the mail,
and national security exchanges pure from fraudulent schemes, tricks, devices, and all forms of
manipulation". Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F. 2d 195, 202 (1960), certiorari
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). 122

It could be argued that such an approach to conduct-based jurisdiction is particularly appropriate when the SEC is the plaintiff. Commission enforcement actions
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are primarily directed toward seeking injunctive relief against certain conduct. The
activities sought to be enjoined might be part of a continuing course of conduct. In
such a case, even if the activities could be confidently termed preparatory, or
incidental, it would be appropriate to grant injunctive relief to prevent unpredictable future results of or developments from such conduct. Moreover, a court in
a Commission injunctive action would not have to be concerned about the competing interests of foreign governments in the case as a whole or problems of
enforceability. An injunction in such a case would not necessarily put a stop to the
fraud, but would protect against the use of the jurisdictional means in connection
with the fraud.
The Commission has also argued for application of the U.S. securities laws to
acts done outside the U.S. which have an impact within the U.S. 123 The Commission has contended that the U.S. securities laws are generally applicable to foreign
transactions when such application is necessary to protect U.S. investors and
markets. 124 It would appear essential in these days of rapid communications and
relatively free passage among nations for the U.S. to assert jurisdiction in such cases
in order to prevent easy evasion of U.S. laws.

11. International cooperation
As indicated, the Commission has disagreed with those who express concern that
a broad assertion of jurisdiction will damage international relations or international
business. Indeed, international cooperation has been extensive and extremely
valuable in two of the Commission's most significant international cases: S.E.C. v.
Vesco 125 and S.E.C. v. American Institute Counsellors,Inc. 126 The Vesco case has
been one of the Commission's most complicated and far-reaching enforcement
actions. The Commission named 42 corporate and individual defendants and alleged
violation of the antifraud, filing, and proxy provisions of the Exchange Act. 127
Included among the defendants were four foreign banks, a foreign bank holding
company, and four foreign mutual funds. 128
The prosecution of the Vesco case has been extremely difficult and complex and
has been significantly impeded by the evasive efforts of certain of the defendants. 129 Nevertheless, much has been accomplished since the institution of the
case to prevent the further looting of the IOS Funds, thanks largely to an extraordinary, and probably unique, international cooperative effort. The Commission
conferred with interested foreign governments, and a committee of regulatory
authorities from the U.S., the federal government of Canada, the Provinces of
Quebec and Ontario, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands Antilles was established for
the purpose of coordinating the recovery, realization and administration of the
assets of the various parts of the Vesco empire. 130 Through the efforts of this committee, and with the cooperation of the courts, liquidators and trustees have been
appointed abroad for many of these entities, including IOS, Ltd. itself. 131
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In the Commission's suit, preliminary and final relief was granted against
numerous defendants. 132 Among those against whom final judgments were obtained (by default) were Bahamas Commonwealth Bank Limited, 133 Overseas
Development Bank of Luxembourg, S.A., and International Bancorp. In April,
1974, the Commission agreed to a dismissal without prejudice of three Swiss defendants upon their furnishing assurances that they would not violate or knowingly aid
and abet others to violate any U.S. securities laws and that they would furnish full
cooperation in the form of complete and truthful testimony and the production of
relevant documents. 134
The American Institute Counsellors case was one of a number of notable Commission actions against foreign financial institutions which have named Swiss banks
as defendants. Some of these cases have presented delicate problems of diplomacy
because of tension between the Commission's enforcement concerns and the interest
of the Swiss in protecting sovereignty and the integrity of the bank secrecy
laws. 13s Despite the problems, however, the Commission has generally been able to
obtain effective relief.
In the American Institute Counsellors case, the Commission has been particularly successful, thanks to the extensive cooperation of the Swiss banking authorities. In November, 1975, the Commission filed a civil injunctive action against
American Institute Counsellors, a registered investment adviser, and a number
of other defendants, including the Swiss Credit Bank, or Credit Suisse, alleging
that the defendants had engaged in a massive distribution of unregistered goldrelated securities to United States citizens. 136 As indicated in the earlier discussion under "Violations of Foreign Law," the district court issued a temporary
restraining order which, inter alia, ordered the bank to transfer to its New York
branch office all assets held by the bank on behalf of the other defendants. To
comply with that order, Swiss Credit Bank established an irrevocable letter of credit
in the amount of approximately $122,000,000, representing the aggregate credit
balances on deposit with the bank on behalf of the defendants. 137
On June 30, 1976, the court entered a final order against Swiss Credit Bank
pursuant to a stipulation and undertaking of Swiss Credit Bank in which it consented to a final order without admitting or denying the allegations of the Commission's complaint. The final order prohibited Swiss Credit Bank from offering or
selling securities of the various entities involved in the case in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 or from engaging in any business
activities with certain of the entities named in the Commission's complaint when
such entities are acting as unregistered broker-dealers, investment advisers, or
investment companies. Swiss Credit Bank undertook to adopt and implement procedures reasonably calculated to insure that Swiss Credit Bank would not participate in activities of the type alleged in the Commission's complaint. In addition,
Swiss Credit Bank undertook to continue to freeze the assets in the accounts on
deposit with the bank of certain of the defendants in the case. Swiss Credit Bank
also undertook to continue to maintain with its lawyers in Washington, D.C., a
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letter of credit in the amount of approximately $120,000,000 for the purpose of
making payments to the U.S. beneficial owners of the securities which are the subject matter of the case. The ability of the court to use the letter of credit was subject to certain terms and conditions, including the condition that it not be used so
long as the obligations and activities specified in a decree of the Swiss Banking
Commission relating to the disposition of assets which were the subject matter of
the Commission's case were being substantially performed. 138
The decree of the Swiss Banking Commission contemplates a freeze on all assets
to which investors are entitled until such time as a satisfactory plan of distribution
can be implemented. The decree designated a Special Auditor to prepare and effect
the plan of distribution. 139
Other cases have been concluded without such successful cooperation. For
example, the cases of S.E.C. v. CosmopolitanInvestors Funding Co. 140 and S.E.C
v. Bank Vorn Linthgebeit 141 involved sensitive questions concerning the Commission's ability to serve process effectively on the Swiss bank defendants. In November, 1975, the Commission authorized the staff to seek orders from the courts in
these two cases pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1)(E) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, directing service of process to be made by registered mail on certain
Swiss defendants (including the two Swiss banks). The Commission, however, in
light of previously raised objections by the Swiss Government to service of process
by mail into Switzerland, directed the staff to contact the State Department to
determine whether service could be effected in a manner satisfactory to the Swiss
Government.
By April, 1976, no solution to the problem appeared to be available, and the
judge in the Bank Vorn Linthgebeit case was threatening dismissal of the action
against the Swiss defendant. In light of these developments, the Commission authorized the staff to effect service immediately by registered mail into Switzerland.
The State Department was notified of the Commission's intention and expressed
reservations about the procedure.
In June and July, service on the Swiss defendants was effected. This action
prompted both Swiss bank defendants to consent to final judgments of permanent
injunction as prayed for in the complaints. One of the individual Swiss defendants
similarly was enjoined by consent and two others defaulted. The Commission is not
aware that protest to the method of service utilized was made by the Swiss Government.

12. Achievement of the purposes of the securities laws
The Vesco case illustrates some of the problems and possibilities in coping with
international fraud. A good look at that case shows the importance of aggressive
enforcement. It also shows that a broad assertion of jurisdiction need not be inconsistent with international cooperation. It is submitted that decisive action of the
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type initiated by the Commission in the Vesco case can only be beneficial to international business in the long run. The American Institute Counsellors case shows
how a blatant and massive evasion of the registration provisions of the Securities
Act was only brought to an end by a determined effort to enforce the law. 142
As was said earlier, in addition to problems of fraud and registration violations,
cases having international aspects frequently involve violations of the beneficial
ownership disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act. Persons wishing, for whatever reasons, not to disclose their ownership of substantial interests in registered
securities often seek to avail themselves of the protections of foreign bank secrecy
laws. If the Commission were to permit such an attempt to succeed, the Congressional intent in adopting those disclosure provisions could be vitiated. A person
in a position to own sufficient stock in a U.S. company to trigger the disclosure
provisions is probably in a position to cause a foreign bank to act for him and
protect his identity. Accordingly, the Commission has felt that its enforcement
responsibilities left it no choice but to proceed against foreign persons, including
banks if necessary, when such action was required to ensure fulfillment of the purposes of the U.S. securities laws. 143
An example is S.E.C. v. GeneralRefractoriesCompany, 144 in which Swiss Bank
Corp., a Swiss corporation doing business in the U.S., consented to an injunction.
The Commission had alleged that the bank, in effect, had aided its customers in
concealing their ownership andlor control of more than 5% of the outstanding
stock of General Refractories Company. The order enjoined the bank from disposing of, acquiring, or voting General Refractories securities owned or controlled
by certain European defendants, and required the bank to adopt and implement
procedures designed to preclude use of the bank's facilities for further violations of
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder. 145
As noted earlier, the Commission has the authority in appropriate cases to
include foreign financial institutions in its administrative proceedings. A case in
which it did so was In the Matter of Stephen Smith 146 in which the Commission
censured Banque-de-Paris et des Pays-Bas (Suisse), S.A., a Swiss bank, for its part in
a manipulation case. 147 As part of the disposition of the case, the bank agreed that
when it receives orders to purchase more than 5% of any securities offering during
the period of initial distribution, it will inquire of the customer to determine if the
customer has a relationship with the issuer or underwriter which would preclude
the transaction. The bank also agreed in such cases to consult with attorneys
experienced in the U.S. securities laws to determine whether adequate disclosure of
the purchase has been made or will be made in the offering prospectus.
The GeneralRefractories and Stephen Smith cases demonstrate the constructive
results Commission actions, whether by injunction or by administrative proceedings,
can achieve in this area. The cases involved two types of problems - manipulation
and failure to disclose beneficial ownership - which are most difficult to deal with
when persons acting abroad can achieve anonymity. 148 By getting the banks
involved in those cases to agree to adopt procedures designed to prevent violations
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of the U.S. securities laws, the Commission, in effect, enlisted those banks in the
law enforcement effort. Such procedures should not inhibit the banks from serving
the legitimate needs of their customers.

13. Conclusion
The Commission has sought to obtain appropriate judicial relief in cases having
international aspects whenever it appeared necessary to protect investors and the
integrity of the securities markets. In doing so, the Commission has sought international cooperation without sacrificing legitimate law enforcement goals. The
Commission believes that, in the international area, as in the domestic area,
vigorous enforcement of the law is essential to the confidence of investors and to
the strength and efficiency of the securities markets.
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1977, Table CM-V-1), foreign purchases and sales of United States securities increased from a
gross of $7.8 billion in 1965 to a gross of S30.8 billion for the period January to November,
1976.
2 Since Commission investigations are private, this article will not discuss any cases involving
foreign financial institutions which are currently under investigation.
3 To describe the question of the extent to which the U.S. securities laws apply to transactions having transnational or international aspects in terms of "extraterritoriality" may be
somewhat misleading. The use of that term implies an effort to apply the law to events and
persons beyond the territorial limits of the U.S., but in most of the cases of so-called extraterritoriality, jurisdiction has been predicated at least in part on conduct within the U.S. However,
since that term has frequently been used to apply to all sorts of cases having transnational
aspects, it will be used in this article as a convenient shorthand reference.
4 519 F. 2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
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6 548 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
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of securities offered publicly within the U.S. or to U.S. citizens. For a summary of the various
rules and regulations relating to transnational securities offerings by or to U.S. citizens, see
Comment, 7he TransnationalReach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1364-1365
(1973). Also see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13056, December 10, 1976, soliciting
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Forms 20 and 20-K.
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question of extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws. (American Law Institute
Federal Securities Code (Reporter's Revision of Text of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-3, October 1,
1974, as further revised by Tentative Draft No. 5, April 1, 1976)).
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[15 U.S.C. 77b(7) (1970)], Section 2(a) (18) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 115
U.S.C. 80a-2(a) (18) (1970)], and Section 202(a) (10) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
[15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a) (10) (1970)].
12 See Brief for S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 13, Schoenbauin v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200
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27 468 F. 2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
28 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., 519 F. 2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975); Note,American
Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 553 (1976); Sandberg,
The ExtraterritorialReach of American Economic Regulation: The Case of SecuritiesLaw, 17
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Harv. Int'l L. J. 315, 318 (1976); Goldman and Magrino, Some ForeignAspects of Securities
Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(bJ of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934,
55 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1017 (1969); and Brief of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 17, Schoenbaum V.
Firstbrook,
supra n. 12.
29
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972).
30 See Leasco DataProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., 519 F. 2d 974, 988 (2d Cir. 1975); and IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F. 2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecuritiesFraud,89 Harv. L. Rev. 553,554 (1976).
Many commentators have criticized the approach taken by the U.S. Federal courts to extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws for failure to give adequate consideration to
sensitive matters of international relations and economic policy. It has frequently been argued
that implementation of a conflicts or choice of lav approach would facilitate evaluation of all
the important criteria. For example, see Goldman and Magrino, op. cit. supra n. 28; Note,
Jurisdiction-Extra-Territorial
Application of United States SecuritiesLaws-Section 30 (b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Liability ofForeignInsidersfor Short-Swing Transactionsin
American Listed Securities: Roth v. Fund of Funds (2d Cir. 1968), 10 Colum. J.Transnat'l L.
150, 156 (1971); Sandberg. op. cit. supra n. 28; and Becker, ExtraterritorialDimensions of the
Securities Exchange Act, 2 Int'l L. and Pol. 233 (1969). For a more general treatment, see
Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the InternationalReach of American
Regulatory Legislation, 22 Ohio St. L. J.586 (1961).
Nevertheless, although U.S. courts have expressed some sensitivity in this area, and many
have considered a wide variety of factors, none appear to have used choice of law principles in
any formal way in applying the U.S. securities laws.
The Commission has not been among the advocates of the use of choice of law principles in
extraterritoriality cases. The Commission's position will be set forth in more detail later. However, it is interesting to note that application of choice of law principles might operate to defeat
a Commission injunctive action in circumstances in which a private plaintiff would be able to
maintain a suit for damages. If a court determines that the U.S. securities laws do not reach a
transaction, it may still hear the case while applying foreign law, even if the U.S. securities laws
are the basis of the court's jurisdiction. See Sandberg, op. cit. supra n. 28 and cases cited
therein. However, the Commission is a creature of Congress and has only that authority to sue
which has been given to it by statute. The Comission's authority to sue under Section 21(d) of
the Exchange Act says nothing about suing for violations of foreign laws. Consequently, it is
questionable whether the Commission would be able to maintain a suit if the court determined
to apply foreign law.
31 See Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., andllTv. Vencap Ltd., all cited supra n. 30.
32 See Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule 10b-5,supra n. 7, at 1370, for the
argument that Leasco set limits on the reach of Section 10(b) short of the boundaries of international law. See Sandberg, op. cit. supra n. 28 for the argument that the courts have established a "minimum connection" theory. See Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud,supra n. 28, for the argument that the courts have construed the application
of Rule 10b-S more narrowly than would be permitted by the Restatement. See Karmel, op.
cit. supra n. 8, for the argument that the Bersch court refused to assert jurisdiction as to "predominantly foreign" transactions although the Restatement would have permitted it. The
Bersch court had no doubt that specified activities within the U.S. were sufficient to permit the
U.S. to impose a rule pursuant to Section 17 of the Restatement, but went on to state: "When,
as here, a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it
must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United
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States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries." S19 F. 2d at 985.
Also see the district Court opinion in S.E.C. v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D.C. N.J.,
1975). However, in Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court stated
that Restatement Sections 17 and 18 contained the two basic tests for assessing whether or not
the U.S. has a "significant connection" with a particular transaction sufficient to warrant assertion of jurisdiction.
33 For example, in Leasco the court asked itself:
whether, if Congress had thought
w...
about the point, it would not have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes
to the United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad". 468
F. 2d at 1337.
34 One commentator stated: "The result is that the principles of international law function
as more than mere benchmarks. The plaintiff who is able to sift through the complex facts of a
transnational security sale and point to elements which satisfy one or more of these principles
is in a good position to sustain his jurisdictional claim." Comment, The TransnationalReach of
Rule 10b-5, supra n. 7, at 1370.
35 Section 17 states: "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not
such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory."
Relative to subsection (b), it should be noted that, in the words (including footnote) of the
Leasco court: "Vhile the black letter seems to require that, in a case like this, not only there
should be conduct within the territory but also the conduct relate "to a thing located, or a
status or other interest localized, in its territory", Comment A and Illustrations 1 and 2, the
latter of which [1] is quite pertinent here, appear to be satisfied if there has been conduct
within the territory."
"[1

X and Y are in State A. X makes a misrepresentation to Y. X and Y go to State B.
Solely because of the prior misrepresentations, Y delivers money to X. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money by false pretenses. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 45."
468 F. 2d at 1334.
36 Section 18 states: "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) The conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constitutuent elements of crime or
tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activities to which the rule
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
37 It has also been suggested that: "... a mix of partially local conduct and some local
effects also establishes a minimum connection with the United States, though neither the conduct nor the effects alone would justify application of the Securities Act". Sandberg, op. cit.
supra n. 28.
38 Restatement Section 17,supran. 35.
39 See S.E.c. v. United FinancialGroup, Inc., 474 F. 2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973) and Brief
of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 13, Schoenbaumn v. Firstbrook, supra n. 12. It should be noted
that, in the words of the Leasco court: ".... we see no reason why, for purposes of jurisdiction
to impose a rule, making telephone calls and sending mail to the United States should not be
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deemed to constitute conduct within it". 468 F. 2d at 1335.
40 See e.g., Ellis v. Carter,291 2d F. 270 (9th Cir. 1961); also see Brief of S.E.C. as Amicus
Curiae at 13, Schoenbaun v. Firstbrook, supra n. 12, and Memorandum of S.E.C. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 6,IITv. Vencap, Ltd., supra n. 30.
41 Leasco DataProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Mlaxwell, supra n. 30, and Travis v.Anthes,
473 F. 2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). Both courts said the respective cases were of the Restatement
Section
17 type.
42
Leasco DataProcessingEquipment Corp. v.Maxwell, supra n. 30.
43 519 F. 2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
44 519 F. 2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
45 In S.E.C. v. United Financial Group, Inc., 475 F. 2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), the court
adverted to the Commission's argument that the use of interstate commerce facilities is sufficient to warrant exercise of jurisdiction and stated that that theory might have some merit.
However, the court determined that it was unnecessary to reach that point. See infra n. 134.
46 548 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977). Also see Arthur Lipper Corp. v. S.E.C., 547 F. 2d 171
(2d Cir. 1976).
47 The liquidators of IIT, an investment trust organized in Luxembourg and owned by IOS,
sued Vencap, a Bahamian "venture capital firm" and its officer-directors, who were two U.S.
citizens residing in the Bahamas. Pursuant to negotiations in London and the Bahamas, it had
been agreed that IIT would invest in Vencap. U.S. Counsel for IIT drafted a subscription agreement in New York, and proposed drafts were exchanged in New York between U.S. counsel for
both parties. Closing took place in the Bahamas. Subsequently, Pistell, the founder, chairman,
president, and treasurer of Vencap, who was a U.S. citizen resident in the Bahamas, allegedly
caused Vencap to engage in transactions which resulted in "funneling substantial amounts of
Vencap's funds into his own hands".
48 The court noted that class actions might be treated differently because of possible
limited domestic connections and because of the doubtful binding effect. 519 F. 2d at 1018,
n. 31.
49 The district court again found that it had jurisdiction in 11T v. Vencap, Ltd., 411 F.
Supp. 1094 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
50 519 F. 2d at 1017-1018.
51 The Commission supported IIT's petition for rehearing, contending that the Second
Circuit's decision would be contrary to the interests of defrauded U.S. investors, and would
impede intergovernmental efforts to deal with the after-effects of transnational securities
frauds, contrary to the policy interests of the Commission. Memorandum of the Securities and
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 2, 11T v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F. 2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
52 519 F. 2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975). Bersch was a class action on behalf of many
thousands of foreign investors and 386 U.S. citizens resident both in the U.S. and abroad,
alleging antifraud violations in connection with three offerings of securities of IOS, Ltd., a
Canadian corporation with its principal offices in Switzerland. One offering was sold in Europe
to Europeans; the second was sold to IOS employees, clients and other persons with associations with IOS, approximately 386 of whom were U.S. citizens; and the third was a secondary
offering managed by a Canadian broker-dealer, no part of which was sold to U.S. citizens. The
complaint alleged that officers of IOS, co-defendant underwriters (two of whom were U.S.
citizens), accountants (also U.S. citizens), and officers of a Bahamian subsidiary of OS had met
in the U.S. to structure and initiate the distributions and to draft portions of an allegedly misleading prospectus. The offerings were made outside the U.S., with the prospectuses mailed
from foreign post offices to potential investors. The U.S. resident purchasers apparently
received misleading prospectuses mailed into the U.S. Shortly after the offering, IOS collapsed.
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The district court found and the Court of Appeals appeared to agree that the three offerings
were sufficiently intertwined that it was unrealistic to differentiate among them.
53 In a footnote (519 F. 2d at 987, n. 29), the court indicated that two SEC cases, S.E.C. v.
Gulf IntercontinentalFinance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963), and S.E.C. v. United
Financial Group, Inc., 474 F. 2d 354 (9th Circ. 1973) (see n. 134, infra.), had substantive U.S.
connections in addition to being SEC injunctive actions. The court stated that the plaintiff class
in Travis v. Anthes, 473 F. 2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), consisted of U.S. citizens and noted three
district court decisions which the court said looked the other way (Finch v. Marathon Securities
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Investment PropertiesInt'l., Ltd., v. 1.0.S., Ltd.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. t 93,001 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), aff'd. without opinion (2d Cir. 1971) (unreported), and S.E.C. v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D. N.J.
1975). The Kasser case was subsequently reversed. See n. 60, infra, and accompanying text.
54 519 F. 2d at 987.
55
Id.at 993.
56
Id.at 992.
57
rd.
58
Id. at 993.
59 See notes 51-52, supra, and accompanying text.
60 548 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977). The Kasser case involved alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made by a U.S. citizen and various U.S. and non-U.S. entities controlled by him to a corporation owned by the Province of Manitoba, Canada, in connection with the purchase and sale
of securites. The defendants argued that the transactions alleged in the complaint were essentially non-U.S., having no significant impact on either the U.S. investing public or the U.S.
securities market. The Commission asserted that a court has jurisdiction when a scheme to
defraud non-U.S. entities is devised in the U.S. by U.S. residents who utilize the means of interstate commerce to achieve their objectives. After analyzing various cases applying principles of
international law, the district court acknowledged that "the Restatement approach" would
appear to permit the exercise of jurisdiction where conduct occurred within the borders of the
U.S., but found it necessary to look to Congressional intent to see whether Congress meant
jurisdiction to be extended to its permissible limits in securities law cases. 391 F. Supp. 1167
(D. N.J. 1975). The district court concluded that the principal objective of the U.S. securities
laws was to protect U.S. purchasers and that "Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction on
the Federal courts over an essentially foreign transaction in American securities unless that
transaction has an impact on domestic investors or securities markets". Id. at 1175. The district
court stated that its viev that the transactions were essentially "foreign" was not altered by
what it described as "miscellaneous acts" in the U.S. Those miscellaneous acts included: negotiations in the U.S.; transfer of funds through the New York office of a Swiss bank; execution
of a..master finance agreement in New York; U.S. incorporation of most of the defendant
corporations;
and use of the U.S. malls, telephone and telegraph in furtherance of the scheme.
61
548 F. 2d at 111-112.
62
Id.at 115.
63
Id.
64 540 F. 2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). The case involved a suit by a West German customer of a
registered U.S. broker-dealer against the firm, alleging fraud in connection with securities
purchases executed by the broker-dealer on the basis of instructions transmitted from West
Germany. The court had no doubt that jurisdiction could be invoked because: "The fraudulent
scheme was conceived in the United States by American citizens, involving stock in an
American corporation traded on American over-the-counter exchange, and an American securities broker from his office in New Jersey was responsible for the wrongful omissions. Moreover,
on policy grounds the interest of the United States in regulating the conduct of its brokerdealers in this country and enhancing world teonfidence in its securities market is ample justifi-
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cation for applying the securities laws. We conclude that federal jurisdiction was properly
invoked". Id. at 595.
65 548 F. 2d at 114 (3d Cir. 1977).
66
Id. at 116.
67
rd.
68Id.
69 In F.O.F.Proprietay Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young and Company, 400 F. 2d 1219 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975), which was decided after Bersch and 11T and which involved a non-U.S. plaintiff,
the following actions which the plaintiff alleged had occurred were found to constitute mere
preparation: the fraudulent scheme was devised and carried out by U.S. citizens or corporations
operating from the U.S.; the allegedly misleading offering circular and "comfort letter" were
drafted and reviewed by the defendants in New York; some sales activity occurred in the U.S.;
and the financing and expenditures of the proceeds from the offering were authorized by
persons in the U.S.
70 See n. 36 supra.
71 Three decisions in the Southern District of New York are indicative. In Seizer v. Bank of
Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), the court held that there must be both a
significant connection with the U.S. and a detrimental effect on U.S. investors. The court also
held, however, that a significant connection existed if U.S. investors were involved to their
detriment. In S.E.C. v. Capital Growth Co., S.A. (CR.), 391 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. N.Y. 1974),
the court held that there must be significant conduct in the U.S., or conduct outside the U.S.
having a harmful impact on U.S. investors. In Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa.
1975), the court noted the split in the cases but decided it did not have to take a position since
neither test was satisfied.
See Karmel, op. cit. supra n. 8, at 678 et seq., for the argument that a careful reading of the
cases discloses that both conduct and effects have been required. However, see Sandberg, op.
cit. supra n. 28, at 319, for the argument that either conduct, effect or an appropriate mix is
sufficient.
72 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) rey'd on rehearing on other
grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), was a derivative suit
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lob-5 thereunder in which the plaintiff
alleged the sale of treasury shares of a Canadian corporation to other non-U.S. persons at the
market price when defendants possessed undisclosed favorable material inside information.
Shares of the Canadian corporation were listed on the American Stock Exchange. The district
court dismissed the action on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. However, the court of appeals held that subject matter jurisdiction existed
where transactions taking place outside the U.S. involved stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange and were detrimental to the interests of U.S. investors. The court
also concluded that the facts of the case alleged a sufficiently serious effect upon U.S. commerce to warrant assertion ofjurisdiction.
'73 Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934, 69 Colum. L.
Rev. 94, 102 (1969), and Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule lOb-5, supra n. 7, at
1380.
74 405 F. 2d at 206.
75 See Karmel, op. cit. supra n. 8, at 678-679; Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud,supra n. 28, at 556-557, and Sandberg, op. cit. supra n. 28, at 319320.
76 519 F. 2d at 991. The court characterized as "debatable" assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction over a U.S. and a Canadian underwriter which had managed the two offerings which
were not made to U.S. residents. The court indicated that the question would turn on whether
the activities of the underwriters, whether in the U.S. or abroad, could be considered as essential to carrying out the offering to U.S. residents.
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77 Id. at 993. The characterization of this aspect of the case appears to be somewhat inconsistent with the same court's finding in Leasco that: "... . we see no reason why, for purposes of
jurisdiction to impose a rule, making telephone calls and sending mail to the United States
should not be deemed to constitute conduct within it". 468 F. 2d at 1335.
See also Madonick v. Denison Mines, Ltd., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. See. L.
Rep. 1 94,550 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
78 519 F. 3d at 991.
79 473 F. 2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
80
Id. at 527-528.
81 549 F, 2d at 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
82 Id. at 135. The California Court of Appeals recently took the same position in UFITEC,
S.A. v. Carter,CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 95,874 (Ct. App. Cal. 1977), a contract suit in a state
court. The question arose because the defendant claimed the contract was void pursuant to
Section 29 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78cc (1970)].
83 Bersch v. DrexelFirestone,Inc., supra n. 30, at 989.
84
Id., and Leasco DataProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell, supra n. 30.
85 Investnent Properties International,Ltd. v. LO.S., Ltd. f 1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 93,011 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
86 Recanian v.Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
87 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., supra n. 30, at 989.
88
1d.
89 Also see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,supra n. 72.
90 See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F. 2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968).
91 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., supra n. 30.
92 It is fundamental that a nation may govern the conduct of its citizens anywhere in the
world. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., supra n. 30, at 985. However, the courts have not discovered a Congressional intent to so apply the securities laws. As the court said in 1IT: "Taking
first the element that 'one defendant, who owns and controls other defendants is a United
States citizen', we do not think that this alone would give subject matter jurisdiction. ... It
is simply unimaginable that Congress would have wished the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to apply if, for example, [the American defendant] while in London had done all the
acts here charged and had defrauded only European investors". 519 F. 2d at 1016.
Nevertheless, some cases have gone far enough in asserting jurisdiction in cases involving
U.S. defendants to suggest that nationality may have been an influencing factor. See Karmel,
op. cit. supra n. 8, at 688, Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule lOb-5, supra n. 7, at
1387-1389, citing S.E.C. v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla.
1963), and S.E.C. v. United FinancialGroup, Inc., 474 F. 2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
93
hzternationalShoe Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
94 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
95 Travis v. Anthes, 473 F. 2d 515, 529 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment
Corp. v. Maxwell, supra n. 30, at 1339; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., supra n. 30, at 998.
96 468 F. 2d at 1340. Of course, "personal jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by valid
service of process". Wagiman v.Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497,499 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), citing 1 Moore's
Federal Practice V0.60 [10], n. 7 (1972).
97 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
98
468 F.2d at 1340.
99
Ferraioliv. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
lOOFogel v. Chestnutt, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,133
(S.D. N.Y. 1968).
101 473 F. 2d at 529.
102 468 F. 2d at 1342.
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103 519 F. 2d at 998.
104 One case appears out of line in this regard. In Wagnan v.Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.
N.Y. 1974), the court found that it would violate due process to exercise personal jurisdiction
over non-U.S. beneficial owners of more than 10% of the shares of a non-U.S. corporation in a
case allegedly subject to Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. The court found no minimal connection between the individual defendants and the U.S., even though the corporation in question was registered with the SEC and the individual defendants filed certain reports required of
officers, directors, and 10% beneficial owners of registered companies. In reaching its conclusions, the court appeared to give great weight to criticisms of Section 16(b) and to the fact that
Ontario, Canada, had no similar provisions. The court was not persuaded by the argument that
registration is implicitly conditioned on compliance by insiders with Section 16 and that the
defendants recognized as much when they fulfilled the reporting requirements of Section 16(a).
106 Such persons include brokers, dealers, and banks (see Schoenbaun v. Firstbrook,supra
n. 72),
but not mutual funds (see Roth v. Fundof Funds, Ltd., supra n. 90).
10 7
Roth v. Fund of Funds,Ltd., supra n. 90; Arthur Lipper Corp. v. S.E.C., supra n. 46.
108 In its amnicus curiae brief in Schoenbaumn, the Commission argued that Section 30(b)
had no relation to those provisions of the Exchange Act which based jurisdiction on use of the
jurisdictional means or the presence of a registered security, but only related to those provisions
which made the jurisdictional triggering element the identity of a person involved, particularly
the brokerdealer registration provisions. The Commission contended that: ".. . the purpose was
to authorize the Commission to promulgate rules to reach foreign transactions not involving the
use of a jurisdictional means or a registered security whenever necessary to prevent evasion of
the Act and, at the same time, to limit the otherwise universal application of certain provisions
of the Act to persons in the securities business in the absence of those elements or such rules".
Brief of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 24, Schoenbaumn v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968).
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,Inc. v. TransamericaCorporation,303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. N.Y.
1969). That case cited Section 30(b) as authority for rejecting the notion that credit regulations
adopted by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to Section 7 of the Exchange Act applied to
loans by non-U.S. banks to a U.S. corporation to finance a tender offer for stock of a U.S.
corporation. See also Bank of Bermuda Limited v. Rosenbloom, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
V95,820 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). By contrast, see U.S. v. WVeisscredit Banca CommercialeED'Investivnenti, cited and discussed supra at n. 17. That case held, in effect, that non-U.S. banks cannot
avail themselves of the Section 30(b) exemption if the transactions take place within the U.S.,
and that such banks may be treated as broker-dealers with respect to such transactions.
Also see UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, supra n. 82, in which the California Court of Appeals
rejected the contention of a Swiss banking corporation that the Exchange Act did not apply if
U.S. credit was not involved. The court felt there was U.S. impact in the form of capital outflow when a U.S. investor received non-U.S. credit to speculate in non-U.S. securities on nonU.S. exchanges.
109 In its brief in the case of Fontainev. S.E.C., 295 F. Supp. 880 (D. Puerto Rico 1966),
the Commission took the position that general rules, particularly those relating to the records
and conduct of registered broker-dealers, if adopted for the purpose of preventing evasion of
the Act, are rules within the meaning of the last clause of Section 30(b), even if not adopted
specifically pursuant to that rule. Consequently, conduct in contravention of such general rules
would not be exempted by Section 30(b). See Reply Memorandum of Defendants Securities
and Exchange Commission at 12-13, Fontainev. S.E.C., supra. The court did not reach this
particular question. It did, however, conclude that: "The mere fact that a registered brokerdealer engaged in foreign activities does not create a bar to the exercise of United States jurisdiction; foreign business operations which have an effect in the United States may, under
appropriate circumstances, be subject to applicable United States law". 295 F. Supp. at 890.
110 546 F. 2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976).
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In Socigtg Internationalev. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), the U.S. Supreme Court conI
fronted this problem in a case under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The claimant in that case
asserted that it was unable to produce certain relevant documents because to do so would
involve disclosure of banking records in violation of Swiss laws. The district court had ordered
production and had dismissed the case for noncompliance. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court found that the district court was justified in issuing the production order but
determined that dismissal was not an appropriate sanction for failure to comply when it had
been established that such failure was due to inability and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault of the petitioner. However, the court went on to imply strongly that the inability of the
petitioner to produce the documents might prove a serious handicap in its efforts to prove its
case.
112 546 F. 2d at 341. For a different approach, see U.S. v. FirstNational City Bank ("Citibank"), 396 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), one of the cases criticized by the Finesilver court. The
Second Circuit affirmed a finding of contempt against Citibank for failure to produce documents in the possession of its branch in West Germany. The court found that production would
apparently not violate West German criminal law and would at most expose Citibank to civil
liability. However, the court rested its determination not so much on its conclusions as to
whether or not production would violate the law as on a balancing of the U.S. and West
German national interests and on an analysis of the hardships Citibank would suffer, an
approach suggested by Restatement Section 40.
113 546 F. 2d at 342. The court also implied that Andersen should not have purported to
speak for the U.S. on the subject of international comity but should have sought to have appropriate officers and agencies of the U.S. make such representations to the court as they might
deem suitable.
114 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,388 (D. D.C. 1975).
115 See Note, Extraterritoriality- Enforcement of United States Court Orders Conflicting
with Foreign Law or Policy - Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Institute
Counsellors, hIc., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,388 (D. D.C. 1975), 17 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 679
(1976).
116 Memorandum of Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Rehearing at 10, /Tv. Vencap, Ltd., supra n. 30.
117 Brief of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 13, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,supra n. 12; Memorandum of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 3, lIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., supra n. 30.
118 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); S.E.C. v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
119 Memorandum of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 3-4,
IITv. Vencap, Ltd., supra n. 30.
120 Id. at 4-6.
121 Brief for Appellant at 33, S.E.C. v. Kasser,supra n. 60.
122 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 18, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,supra n. 12.
123 Brief for Appellee at 38-40, S.E.C. v. United FinancialGroup, Inc., supra n. 92. The
Commission expressed particular concern about the adverse effects on the U.S. balance of payments and capital markets flowing from abuses by offshore funds, particularly those operated
by U.S. persons or those which represent or imply regulation by the SEC.
124 Brief for S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae at 14, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,supra n. 12. The
Commission has cited the 1IT court's statement that "it]his country would surely look askance
if one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured
into the United States". Brief of Respondent at 54,ArthurLipper Corp. v. S.E.C., supra n. 46,
citing 519 F. 2d at 1017. The Commission has noted the difficulties that other governments
interested in an international transaction might have obtaining effective jurisdiction over defen-
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dants, obtaining evidence, and enforcing judgments (Brief for Appellant at 33, S.E.C. v. Kasser,
supra n. 60), and has argued that extraterritorial application of securities laws may contribute
to international cooperation. (Memorandum of S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition
for Rehearing at 10, 1IT v. Vencap, Ltd., supra n. 30).
125 Civil No. 72-5001 (CES) (S.D. N.Y., filed November 27, 1972).
126 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 195,388 (D. D.C. 1975).
127 The complaint alleged, in substance, that Vesco and his group, acting through International Controls Corp., a U.S. corporation, acquired control of lOS, Ltd., the investment
adviser and manager of a complex of non-U.S. mutual funds. The Vesco group then looted the
mutual funds of in excess of $225 nlllion by having the mutual funds sell the funds'
marketable securities and by using the proceeds from such sales to further the Vesco group's
'activities.
The defendants named in this part of the case included, among many others, International
Bancorp, a Bahamian corporation, which was a holding company for various banking assets
spun off by IOS; Bahamas Commonwealth Bank, a Bahamian corporation which was majorityowned by International Bancorp; and Overseas Development Bank Luxembourg, a non-U.S.
corporation which maintained its principal executive offices in Luxembourg and which was
wholly-owned by International Bancorp. The banks, which were newly formed and thinly
capitalized, served as conduits in that control and custody of the cash and portfolio securities
of the IOS funds were transferred from independent and responsible custodian banks to defendant banks. Subsequentiy, the funds' assets were used as the Vesco group sawv fit.
128 The mutual funds, Fund of Funds, IIT, Venture Fund, and Transglobal Growth Fund
Limited (known collectively as the IOS Dollar Funds), were the victims of the fraud perpetrated by Vesco and his associates but were included as defendants in the injunctive action in
order to obtain effective relief.
129 As has been widely reported, Vesco and his associates were able to remove large portions of the funds' assets and were able successfully to seek sanctuary first in the Bahamas and
then in Costa Rica. For a full narrative treatment of this matter, see Hutchison, VESCO,
Praeger Publishers, Inc. (New York, 1974).
130 See 40 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 20 (1974).
131 Id. In particular, on December 18, 1973, the Luxembourg court declared lIT to be in
liquidation and appointed liquidators. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae in IT v. Lam, No. 75-1062 (10th Cir. 1975). On February 14,
1974 and April 4, 1974, a court in the Netherlands Antilles declared Venture Fund to be bankrupt and in liquidation and appointed two individuals to be its trustees. On August 1, 1973, the
Supreme Court of Ontario appointed a liquidator for Fund of Funds and IOS Growth Fund.
Judge Stewart in S.E.C. v. Vesco has recognized the primary role of these liquidators and
trustees. See Consent Order in S.E.C. v. Vesco, Civ. No. 72-5001 (CES) (S.D. N.Y., dated
November 30, 1973). The consent order appointed a special receiver for Fund of Funds and
IOS Growth Fund, but noted the efforts of the Committee referred to in the text and recognized the primary authority and responsibility of the liquidator appointed by the Supreme
Court of Ontario, where the funds were incorporated. Judge Stewart also recognized the roles
of the liquidators for IIT and Venture Fund. See Order entered in S.E.C. v. Vesco, Civ. No.
72-5001 (CES) (S.D. N.Y., dated October 29, 1974).
132 See Preliminary Injunction in S.E.C. v. Vesco, Civ. No. 72-5001 (CES) (S.D. N.Y.,
dated November 8, 1973). Also see InternationalControls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F. 2d 1334 (2d
Cir. 1974).
133 The Bahamas Finance Minister cancelled this defendant's banking license in June, 1974,
for acting in a manner detrimental to the public interest. See Hutchison, YESCO, Praeger Publishers, Inc. (Nev York, 1974), p. 360.
134 The Commission has instituted a number of actions against non-U.S. mutual funds. One
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of the few decided Commission cases in this area was S.E.C. v. United Financial Group, Inc.,
supra n. 92, in which the Ninth Circuit upheld jurisdiction in a Commission injunctive action
against a U.S. holding company which controlled a large number of service and investment companies incorporated outside the U.S. The court found a number of shareholders with addresses
in the U.S. The court also found that United Financial Group advertised in overseas editions of
U.S. publications which were read by U.S. citizens abroad; that three U.S. citizens living abroad
swore they had been sold shares of United Financial Group companies; and that an offer to
exchange shares had been made to a U.S. citizen in the U.S. The court also found that interstate
facilities were used in distributions of prospectuses, to set up sales meetings, and to consummate investment transactions. See also S.E.C. v. Gulf IztercontinentalFinance Corp., supra n.
92.
Another decided case involving non-U.S. mutual funds was S.E.C. v. Capital Growth Co.,
S.A. (C.R.), supra n. 71, an injunctive action against a Costa Rican investment company and
various related entities alleging a course of conduct designed to convert the assets of the Capital
Growth companies in violation of Rule 1Ob-5. The district court stated the applicable standard
as follows: "The leading cases in this circuit make it clear that subject matter jurisdiction will
attach to the transactions here in issue if it can be established either that there was significant
conduct within the territorial limits of the United States or that there was extraterritoral conduct which was harmful to and which had an impact upon United States investors". 391 F.
Supp. at 596-597.
The court considered allegations that U.S. shareholders had purchased defendant's securities
through the U.S. mails after receiving a sales talk in New York; that the stock certificates and
periodic literature about the companies had been sent through the mails to U.S. investors; and
that the company had made representations stressing the company's ties with the U.S. and its
securities markets. The court concluded that there was both impact on U.S. investors and conduct which was harmful to and which had an impact upon United States investors". 391 F.
In still another non-U.S. mutual fund case, S.E.C. v. Everest Management Corporation,Civil
No. 71-4932 (S.D. N.Y., November 7, 1975), the Commission named First National City Trust
Company (Bahamas) Ltd. as a defendant, charging violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Federal securities laws. The defendant, a subsidiary of First National City Bank, allegedly participated in the dissemination of false and misleading information in connection with the sales of
securities in a non-U.S. mutual fund and distribution of false and misleading periodic reports
to the fund's shareholders. The Commission also alleged that the defendant failed to supervise
the activities of the fund's investment manager. The defendant and certain of its employees
consented to entry of a judgment permanently enjoining them from engaging in the alleged
violative activities. Bank Hofmann, a defendant in the Cosmopolitan case (see n. 140, infra, and
accompanying text), was also a defendant in this case.
135 42 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 126-127 reported that:
"The ratification process continued on the Treaty between the United States and Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ....
"In general, the Treaty provides for broad cooperation between the two countries in
criminal matters. Provision is made for assistance in locating witnesses, obtaining witnesses'
statements and testimony, the production and authentication of business records, and the
service of judicial and administrative documents. The Treaty also provides for special assistance
in cases involving organized crime.
"The Treaty should be of assistance to the Commission in major cases where Swiss financial
institutions are utilized to engage in securities transactions in the United States, or where funds
resulting from illegal activities are secreted in such situations".
The Treaty was ratified on June 21, 1976 (122 CONG. REC. S. 9980 (daily ed. June 21,
1976)).
136 The complaint alleged numerous securities laws violations including violations of the
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registration, antifraud, record-keeping, and broker-dealer provisions, and of the Investment
Company Act and Investment Advisers Act registration provisions. Simultaneously with tile
filing of the complaint, certain of the defendants other than the bank consented to the entry of
a judgment of permanent injunction enjoining them from violations of the U.S. federal securities laws and also to certain ancillary relief.
137 In December, 1975, a Judgment of Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief with findings of fact and conclusions of law was issued against certain defendants other than the bank.
The judgment required, among other things, that anyone holding funds or other assets on
behalf of the defendants identify such assets in writing to tle Special Counsel appointed by the
court. On January 27, 1976, pursuant to this judgment, Swiss Bank Corp. notified the district
court that it held $18.6 million in assets on behalf of the defendants. Another Swiss bank, Bank
Leu, A.G., notified, the Commission's staff that it also held assets on behalf of the defendants.
The Swiss banks voluntarily froze all assets of the defendants in their possession pending the
outcome of the litigation.
138 SEC Litigation Release No. 7475, July 1, 1976.
139 All information collected by the Special Auditor was to be provided to the Commission except that the names of the investors would not be given to the Commission unless the
Swiss Banking Commission determined that fraud and misrepresentation had occurred in connection with the specific investments with which the investors were involved; written consent
of the investors was obtained; or information was provided with respect to investors whose
identities were already in the Commission's possession. SEC Litigation Release No. 5721,
August 13, 1976.
140 Civil Action No. 75-666 (M.D. Pa., filed June 6, 1975). The Commission filed a civil
injunction action against Cosmopolitan Investors Funding Co., two Cosmopolitan officers, Bank
Hofmann A.G., a Swiss Bank, and two of its officers, and others for alleged violations of the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. Cosmopolitan and its officers were also charged with
violations of the reporting and proxy provisions* of the Exchange Act. The Cosmopolitan
officers allegedly established an illegal kickback scheme in which they caused Cosmopolitan to
purchase shares of two non-U.S. mutual funds having little or no value, and to deposit a portion
of the proceeds in secret Bank Hofmann accounts for the benefit of the Cosmopolitan officers.
The bank officers were also officers of the company from which Cosmopolitan purchased the
mutual fund shares, and they allegedly knew the details of the kickback transaction. The complaint further alleged that the bank officers handled the mechanics of the transaction through
secret code-name accounts for the Cosmopolitan officers and that the bank officials distributed
the proceeds to the participants in the scheme and shared in those proceeds. See SEC Litigation
Release No. 6927, June 11, 1975.
141 Civil No. 75-903 (S.D. Fla., filed May 27, 1975). In May, 1975, the Commission
brought an injunctive action against Bank Vom Linthgebeit, a Swiss bank, and others, alleging,
among other things, that during 1971 the defendants engaged in a scheme to manipulate tile
market price of securities of Investment Property Building, Inc. The Commission alleged that
the scheme was furthered by an agreement to acquire a large block of Investment Property
shares through the use of a secret bank account at Bank Vom Linthgebeit. See SEC Litigation
Release No. 9602, May 27, 1975.
142 A rare case involving a foreign bank as an actual issuer of securities was S.E.C. v.
Normandie Co., Civil No. 72-1531-JLK (S.D. Fla. June 8, 1973). In September, 1972, the
Commission successfully sued to enjoin Normandie Trust Company from the sale of virtually
worthless Letters of Credit issued by Normandie. Although Normandie, a Panamanian corporation, purported to be a bank and to perform numerous banking functions, its sole activity to
the date of the complaint was to sell these Letters of Credit through the use of false and misleading information. The total face value of the Letters of Credit offered by Normandie was
over $27 million.
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The Commission has also placed foreign banks on its Foreign Restricted List, which is
designed to alert the public to possible unlawful distributions of foreign securities in the U.S.
See Response of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Request of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities Dated December 19, 1975, February 9, 1976, at 30.
143 The Commission has also moved on the administrative front to attempt to prevent
abuses in this area. On January 27, 1976, the Commission, in Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 12055, proposed an amendment to Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a) (9) which, in effect,
would permit brokers to handle transactions for a non-U.S. financial institution acting for other
beneficial owners only if the institution agreed to reveal the identity of the beneficial owners at
the Commission's request. Any information so obtained would be confidential unless the Commission used it in an enforcement action. The institution would have to obtain whatever
consents or waivers local law might require. The Commission issued a further release on the subject on January 10, 1977 (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13149), but has not yet
adopted the amendment.
144 Civil No. 75-0809 (D. D.C. September 4, 1975). See also S.E.C. v. Banque-de-Pariset
des Pays-Bas (Suisse), Civil No. 77-0798 (D. D.C. May 10, 1977) and S.E.C. v. Bethnann
Bank, et al., Civil No. 77-0872 (D. D.C., filed May 23, 1977).
case who were enjoined in S.E.C. v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D. D.C.
1975), have appealed (Nos. 75-1973 and 76-1061 (consolidated) (D.C. Cir. 1975)), alleging,
in part, lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. These defendants had been served with
process in Switzerland by registered mail pursuant to Rule 4(i) (1) (E), and objected on the
ground that such service did not conform to Swiss procedure. The Commission has contended,
however, that such service is valid even though failure to comply with Swiss desires might
render unavailable Swiss assistance in enforcing a final judgment. The Commission cited the
note of the advisory committee which drafted Rule 4(i), as well as numerous cases. See Brief of
SEC at 72-74, S.E.C. v. General Refractories Co., Nos. 75-1973 and 76-1061 (consolidated)
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
146 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11597 (August 15, 1975).
14" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12192 (March 11, 1976). The bank was
alleged to have withheld a large portion of a public offering of Pelorex Corporation stock from
the public market, and to have acted in concert with another defendant in artificially limiting
the availability of Pelorex stock from the beginning of the offering. The bank was also charged
with reselling at a substantial profit a portion of the stock so withheld at a later date.
148 For a case involving both problems, see S.E.C. v. EdwardM. Gilbert, et al., Civil No.
76-366 (S.D. N.Y., filed January 21, 1976). On January 21, 1976, the Commission filed an
injunctive action against numerous persons, including two Swiss banks, charging violations of
the antifraud and beneficial ownership reporting provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws in
connection with the purchase and sale of common stock of Conrac Corporation. The defendants, including the two Swiss banks, allegedly manipulated the price of Conrac shares through
prearranged trades, by placing increasingly higher bids for Conrac shares, and by dominating
and controlling the trading market for Conrac shares. The complaint also alleged that certain of
the defendants, including the two Swiss banks, acting as a group, failed to comply with the
appropriate reporting provisions of the Exchange Act after acquiring in excess of 5% of the outstanding common stock of Comrae. SEC Litigation Release No. 7254, January 28, 1976.
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